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Abstract. Any new attempt to cope with the problem of theodicy is forced to reinterpret 
and remodify the classic set of divine attributes. Classical monotheism, at least in the 
Christian or Islamic tradition, emphasizes the concept of God as a personal, almighty 
being who is in a completely free relation to the world. However, even within Christianity 
we find other tendencies which might help us to rewrite the idea that God has some 
sort of libertarian and unrestricted access to the world. The following article raises the 
question whether God, as an absolute being, can influence the course of the world directly. 
The answer to this question has an enormous impact on the problem of theodicy: If 
God’s non-intervention is based on God’s essence (rather than any form of initial self-
restriction), then God cannot be held directly responsible for not performing direct acts 
of intervention.
The Battlefield
Is there any current debate on theodicy? If we put it this way, we have 
to say that there is always a current debate on theodicy. The problem in 
question is an everlasting problem for theology and philosophy as well, 
but the increasing pressure coming from atheistic writers (one might 
recall the very sketchy and philosophically biased book The God Delusion 
by Richard Dawkins) forces philosophy and theology to take a look at 
the problem of theodicy over and over again.
On the other side, a brief look at the contemporary agenda of system-
atic theology leaves us with the strange impression that the battlefield is 
already quiet. A large percentage of systematic theologians endorse what 
is often referred to as the “free-will-approach”; a minority still holds on 
to other “solutions” of the problem in question. Thus, three parties seem 
to segregate the area of interest and you can find hardly any compromise 
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between them.1 The contemporary approaches still circle around the 
so-called free-will-defense2 (FWD) on the one side, and around process-
theodicy3 (PT) and a mystery-approach on the other. In addition to the 
above mentioned strategies, Friedrich Hermanni has recently proposed 
a defense of Leibniz’s best-of-all-possible-worlds strategy. His consid-
erations may help us to get some valuable insights into certain notions 
which constitute the backbone of the problem of theodicy. Therefore, it 
is worthwhile to take a sidestep to examine some aspects of Her manni’s 
No-Better-World-Theory in addition to a reevaluation of FWD.
Although FWD and PT share a common appreciation of human 
freedom, they represent rivaling positions and disagree with respect to 
some crucial issues: free-will-theodicy theorists, like Richard Swinburne4 
or Alvin Plantinga5, emphasize a so-called “classical” concept of God — a 
concept which tells us that God has to be regarded as an almighty, 
completely good, benevolent, non-material, omniscient, and perfect 
person Who is in a free and interpersonal relationship to the world as 
a creation that emerged out of nothing else but God’s initial act alone. 
So, for the free-will-theodicy theorist, every process-theological account 
involves either the immediate abandoning of Christian theism6, or an 
almost blatant withdrawal into a dualism which is incompatible with 
Christian monotheism.7 On the other side, for the process-theologian, 
1 As an example, see the appendix in the new edition of Armin Kreiner, Gott im Leid: 
Zur Stichhaltigkeit der Theodizee-Argumente (Freiburg i.B.: Herder-Verlag, 2005).
2 Compare as an excellent summary Armin Kreiner, Gott im Leid: Zur Stichhaltigkeit 
der Theodizee-Argumente (Freiburg i.B.: Herder-Verlag, 1997), 207–319. A more recent 
version of FWD can be found in Klaus von Stosch, Gott — Macht — Geschichte: Versuch 
einer theodizeesensiblen Rede vom Handeln Gottes (Freiburg i.B.: Herder-Verlag, 2006). 
3 Cf. David Basinger, Divine Power in Process Theism: A Philosophical Critique (Albany: 
State University of New York Press, 1988); John B. Cobb and David R. Griffin, eds., 
Searching for an Adequate God: A Dialogue between Process and Free Will Theists (Grand 
Rapids and Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2000); John B. Cobb, God and the World (Philadelphia: 
Westminster Press, 1969); David R. Griffin, Evil Revisited: Responses and Reconsiderations 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991).
4 Cf. Richard Swinburne, “The Free Will Defence,” in Teodicea oggi?, ed. Marco M. 
Olivetti (Padua: CEDAM, 1988), 585–596.
5 Cf. Alvin Plantinga, God, Freedom and Evil (London: Allen and Unwin, 1975). 
6 Cf. William Hasker, “The Problem of Evil in Process Theism and Classical Free 
Will Theism,” Process Studies 29 (2000): 194–208; Kreiner 1997, 103–124.
7 Cf. Kreiner 1997, 103–124. 
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free-will-theodicy is a relic of an old-fashioned metaphysics which is 
no longer adequate, given the truth of the evolutionary origin of the 
cosmos and the many accidental events that led to its present stage. 
Furthermore, the idea of a personal God — which is crucial for free-
will-theorists — leads to a much too anthropomorphic picture of God’s 
relation to the world. The classical concept of omnipotence seems to be 
a dead-end street. Therefore, process-theology is searching for a more 
advanced metaphysical ground on which the architecture of the Christian 
worldview can be built– an architecture that is meant to combine the 
ontological commitments of the natural sciences with the conviction 
that there exists a loving, caring and calling God in and beyond the 
universe. Nevertheless, process-theodicy– viewed from the perspective 
of its results — is just another version of a free-will-defense, though 
it points to an important and noteworthy strategy: the restriction of 
God’s omnipotence and ability to intervene on assumed metaphysical 
grounds.
The third group, labeled as “mystery theology,” can’t be easily cat-
egorized or described. One might call it, tentatively of course, the “case 
of Job.” This position permanently puts into question every so called 
“theoretical solution” of the problem of theodicy.8 “Auschwitz” remains 
the key word here, indicating the purely negative result of any attempt to 
resolve the problem in question. Moreover, this approach holds that any 
theoretical answer would be a betrayal of those who suffered immeasur-
able pain in Auschwitz and in other archetypical outcomes of human 
cruelty. The measureless sufferings experienced during the Holocaust 
do not only bring into question any theological attempt, they bring into 
question the trustworthiness of reason itself.9 It is not surprising that a 
more Continental philosophy and theology might support this view; it 
finds adherents in certain branches of post-idealistic and post-modern 
philosophy.
8 Cf. eg. Gerd Neuhaus, Frömmigkeit der Theologie: Zur Logik der offenen Theodizeefrage 
(Freiburg i.B.: Herder-Verlag, 2003). 
9 Cf. Johann Baptist Metz, “Theodizee-empfindliche Gottesrede,” in Land schaft aus 
Schreien: Zur Dramatik der Theodizeefrage, ed. Johann Baptist Metz (Mainz: Grünewald, 
1995), 81–102.
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Hidden Presuppositions
The challenge of atheism is written between the lines of the problem 
of theodicy, though we should be cautious with the assessment of 
this challenge. How powerful can the force of atheism ever be? It is 
noteworthy that atheism has a point only when very specific virtues of 
scientific reasoning are presupposed and acknowledged: for instance, 
the virtue of avoiding inconsistencies or the virtue of choosing the 
better alternative among alternative explanations. While the former 
virtue can be embraced by many people, the latter seems to be obvi-
ous only at first glance: What happens if we cannot come up with 
a better answer to a certain problem? Might an equal response do 
the job? And, besides, who in the end is accountable for determining 
the degree of improvement and examining the value of alternatives? 
It seems too obvious that naturalists, like Dawkins, have a very dif-
ferent understanding of the phrase “better explanation” — different 
from what theists would call “explanation.” And, like it or not, the 
appeal to universally accepted standards of reasoning seems to create 
these standards anytime they are needed rather than just referring to 
something everybody can agree with.
Even with certain standards already in place the problem of theodicy 
does not lead to atheistic conclusions straightforwardly: Alvin Plantinga, 
for example, signed off on the virtue of reasonable discourse; and he 
tried to show, on this very basis of reasonable argumentation, that what 
atheists claim does not, in fact, really hold: There are no inconsistencies 
in Christian theism if we correlate the existence of God with the 
existence of evil because there is no way of transforming the assertion 
that God exists (as a good, powerful, and omniscient God) directly and 
conclusively into the idea that the existence of evil has to be rigidly 
excluded.10
10 Cf. Alvin Plantinga, God and Other Minds: A Study of the Rational Justification of 
Belief in God (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1990), 115–130. Plantinga does 
not deny the existence of evil, but he “forces” the atheist to claim that there are unjustified 
evils. Connecting a broad notion of justification with a Greater-Good-Defense, which 
plays the role of a criterion for morality and goodness, Plantinga arrives at an interesting 
destruction of the assumed inconsistency. 
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So, contrary to what is often claimed by atheists11 and what is often 
repeated by theologians,12 there is no straightforward inconsistency in our 
concept of God — even if we have to state that evil exists in the world. 
Atheists also focus on the problem of evidence: Even if the existence of 
evil does not contradict the existence of God (as a good, all-powerful, 
omniscient God) it might, nevertheless, bring into question our belief 
in the existence of a good, all-powerful and all-knowing God.13 But 
what does that mean? Let us try to understand this position as well 
as we can by furnishing a possible line of argumentation:
“God” is defined as IQMCN (ID QUO MAIUS COGITARI (1) 
NEQUIT)
The property “IQMCN” is explicatively/intensionally identical (2) 
with the conjunction of the properties Q, P, R … (for example: 
perfect moral goodness, perfect wisdom and knowledge, unlimited 
power …)
If an entity (3) x is missing any of the combined properties (for exam-
ple Q) or if it has an opposite property (for example ¬Q), it cannot 
be an IQMCN.
Every (4) x’s having a property Q, P, R … is rigorously related to a certain 
configuration S of states of affairs which itself is the result of the 
combination of instantiated states of affairs (= events) p & q & r.
If the states of affairs (5) p & q & r are not instantiated or the opposite 
states of affairs ¬p & ¬q & ¬r are instantiated, then the assertion of 
“x’s having Q, P, R …” is not allowed, given the common rules of 
meaningful communication or discursive justification.14
11 It is, however, noteworthy that some atheists concede that there is no contradiction 
between the assumption that God exists, on the one hand, and the fact that evil exists 
in the world, on the other; cf. Norbert Hoerster, Die Frage nach Gott (München: Beck, 
2007), 87–113.
12 Cf. von Stosch 2006, 175–180.
13 An echo and caricature of this distinction can be found in Richard Dawkins, The 
God Delusion (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2006), 108–109; cf. 
Hoerster 2007, 113.
14 This version could help us to keep the epistemological tones of an atheistic 
argument without getting into a deeper analysis of statements that are the scope of 
certain beliefs. 
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The existence of evil is the instantiation of states of affairs such that (6) 
it is not permissible to call God a perfectly moral being or a perfectly 
wise or a perfectly almighty being …15
If God cannot be called a “perfectly moral being …” then He cannot (7) 
be an IQMCN. And if He must not be called an IQMCN He is 
not an IQMCN.
If God is necessarily defined as an IQMCN and He is not an (8) 
IQMCN, then He cannot exist due to the ontological principle by 
whose guidance we deny existence to self-contradictorily circum-
scribed entities.
This argument is in accordance with what a certain version of con-
temporary atheism has strategically objected. Take, for example, Kai 
15 Of course, one can doubt the “rule of exclusion.” It is precisely the range of this 
rule which is at stake within the contemporary discussions of atheism. But how can we 
understand this rule? Are there any ways to illustrate it? Let us assume that it is still in 
accordance with the idea that God is the creator of the universe even if we do not find 
signs of divine design in evolution but at a certain point we need some configuration 
of states of affairs which makes belief in God discernible from the belief that no God 
exists. Some theologians insist that the expansion of the universe points to a beginning 
of time which supports the so-called cosmological argument. In their view, the expansion 
of the universe would contribute to a configuration of states of affairs that excludes the 
belief in a purely random origin of the universe or, at least, in the eternity of our universe. 
But, of course, it could be harder to find other examples that fit the proposed problem 
of divine goodness. In the tradition of classic theism the primary attributes of God are 
trans-categorial attributes. And it could be argued that these attributes aren’t subject to 
the rule sentences (4), (5), (6) allude to. Nevertheless, in defense of sentence (6) one could 
try to argue for a specific list of special attributes: like God’s moral goodness. Theologically, 
however, classic theism would have to emphasize that God’s ontological goodness is the 
primary focus which the trans-categorially used notion of “goodness” refers to. In other 
words: Classic theism might not be too impressed by sentences (4), (5), (6) and could 
easily dismiss the whole threat by pointing to the trans-categorial nature of basic divine 
attributes. Sentences (4), (5), (6) have to silently presuppose that intrinsic divine attributes 
are mirrored in relational attributes (which are established upon God’s relation to us) and 
that the rule sentences (4), (5), (6) allude to does apply to these attributes whereby any 
impact on these attributes is considered to have an impact on God’s intrinsic attributes 
as well. But, this is just a presupposition. One might be able to see how this works for 
the attributes “being omnipotent” and “being the creator of the universe.” But it is much 
harder to see the connection between “being ontologically good (= all-desirable)” on the 
one side and being “morally good” (“omni-benevolent”) on the other side. 
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Nielsen’s16 examination of crucial phrases used by theists — an examination 
which was based on certain semantic presuppositions. As pointed out, 
the abovementioned steps are meant to give some credit to atheistic 
challenges by getting rid of some of the loose ends one might find in 
some simpler versions of atheistic challenges. But if we look at the 
“emperor’s new clothes,” is the updated version of an atheistic argument 
better? Is it really convincing? Are its presuppositions written in stone? 
Any answer to this type of atheism has to emphasize the arbitrariness 
of the underlying verificationist semantics of sentences (4) and (5).17 
But in doing so, the achievement of consistency within theism on 
the one hand might cause a loss of significance on the other hand. 
From this perspective, belief in God would become just another case 
of Wittgenstein’s “beetle in a box”18.
Although “significance” is a highly disputed concept within the 
theory of science, to accommodate the atheist’s position, we can describe 
this as:
(SIGN) If we have no criteria for mapping x’s having a property Q to 
a set of states of affairs, we would hardly see any consequences 
of x’s having Q in contrast to x’s not-having Q or even to x’s 
having ¬Q.
So, for the sake of the argument, let us assume that SIGN is a valid 
principle and that (4) and (5) can remain unquestioned, although SIGN 
breathes the air of Popperian falsificationism and although it is not clear 
whether such a principle can and should be applied to theistic propositions. 
But how can we assess proposition (6)? This sentence hardly seems valid. 
In other words: How does the existence of evil in the world create states of 
affairs that count against the assumption that we have reasons to call God 
“good?” As Plantinga pointed out, only if we think that evil is generally 
unjustified or that the greater good it might serve can be accomplished 
16 Kai Nielsen, “On Fixing the Reference Range of ‘God’,” Religious Studies 2 (1966): 
13–36. These ideas can be found in other, more recent publications of Nielsen; cf. eg. Kai 
Nielsen, Naturalism and Religion (Amherst: Prometheus Books, 2001).
17 A critique of verificationism can be found in Plantinga 1990, 156–168.
18 Cf. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophische Untersuchungen, § 293. 
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otherwise, can we create the sort of contradiction an atheist needs.19 But, 
there is no basis for such an assumption. Rhetorically, atheistic strategies 
sometimes appeal to what one might call a principle of benevolence and 
compassion which basically says:
(PBC) Any benevolent and compassionate being a would always reduce 
the suffering of a sensitive person b if a had the means to do so.
This, of course, presupposes that suffering is under any circumstance and 
regardless of any context something that has to be avoided intrinsically. 
But, one can question whether we might find a convincing justifica-
tion of PBC.20 Apart from the vagueness of the key terms, PBC isn’t 
even unanimously held within ethical disputes. Discussions about the 
legitimate execution of power for the well-being of many show that PBC 
can be restricted, even violated, if there is a greater good involved. As a 
matter of fact, adherents of FWD would follow that route. They would 
insist that the execution of free will necessarily limits the range of PBC 
for God. In contrast, PT would focus on the “if ”-clause, which is a crucial 
aspect of PBC. Through a modified understanding of divine omnipotence, 
PT would be able to stick to PBC, but to question its applicability in 
the context of theodicy. Either way, since the atheist cannot presuppose 
that FWD or PT aren’t successful in their interpretations of PBC, he/
she might not have a case here.
Neglected Aspects
The above-mentioned questions, which circle around the applicability 
of a rule alluded to in sentences (4) to (6) suggest that there might not 
be an unequivocal understanding of the crucial phrases. The notion of 
“goodness” is a marvelous example, insofar as divine goodness, at least 
in a classic sense, does not just exceed moral goodness but surpasses 
it. Our difficulties in making the specific distinctions or connections 
might support the idea that a rational response to the problem of 
19 Cf. Plantinga 1990, 122–130.
20 Cf. ibid.
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theodicy is impossible and that it might be more appropriate to bow 
our heads in the light of a mystery which is, first and foremost, a 
conceptual one.
In terms of historical epitomes, we could refer to Immanuel Kant as 
a sophisticated predecessor who used the notorious ambiguity of certain 
terms as a basis to establish a very specific mystery-approach.21 His 
considerations, especially of the problem of theodicy, are to be regarded 
as an early, but very subtle, example of the strategy which is preferred by 
the third group we described at the beginning. Nowadays Kant’s way of 
dealing with the problem of theodicy has become slightly neglected, and 
in the context of academic disputes almost forgotten, although Kant’s way 
of handling the problem is in no way irrational or just another example of 
simply reducing the problem to a theological mystery. It is quite the op-
posite: On the one hand, in a very detailed and fine-grained manner, Kant 
disputes the arguments of the rationalistic philosophy and the protestant 
theology with which he was familiar and which set the agenda at that 
time. On the other hand, Kant stresses the insolvability of the problem 
of theodicy without addressing God’s mysteriousness directly. To discuss 
all of his noteworthy insights would require some in-depth analysis.22 
Instead, let us focus on summarizing the claims Kant made as a result of 
his considerations. In his treatise Über das Mißlingen aller philosophischen 
Versuche in der Theodicee Kant writes:
[U]nsre Vernunft [ist] zur Einsicht des Verhältnisses, in welchem eine Welt, 
so wie wir sie durch Erfahrung immer kennen mögen, zu der höchsten 
Weisheit stehe, schlechterdings unvermögend.23
[Our reason is completely unable to get any insight into the connection 
which relates the world we know by experience to the highest wisdom.]
We can modify and simplify his argument using a modern language, while 
keeping the core message, in the following way: Human reason structur-
ally delivers, Kant would have said, two entirely different concepts of wisdom. 
21 Immanuel Kant, “Über das Mißlingen aller philosophischen Versuche in der 
Theodicee,” in AA, Vol. 8, 253–271.
22 Cf. Richard L. Velkley, Kant as Philosopher of Theodicy (Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan, 1978); Volker Dieringer, Kants Lösung des Theodizeeproblems: Eine Rekonstruktion 
(Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holz boog, 2008).
23 Kant, Über das Mißlingen, 263.
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On the one hand there is a more technical concept of wisdom applicable 
to the data we experience by observing nature and figuring out laws of 
nature. For example, the wings of a butterfly or the eyes of a mammal can 
be called a “product” of technical wisdom insofar as this equipment turn 
out to be perfectly suited to meet environmental conditions. On the other 
hand, we are used to dealing with a so-called moral concept of wisdom 
which is applicable to actions that can then be called “successful” or “good” 
with respect to a given aim and purpose. These concepts of wisdom, as 
Kant points out, do not fit together. These concepts have to be treated and 
applied separately. Otherwise, the result would be a persistent category-
mistake and a perennial source of philosophical deception. But when we 
approach the problem of theodicy, we are necessarily tempted, as Kant 
would have said, to combine, even to fuse both concepts by wondering 
whether the structure of the world, which allows room for any kind of 
evil, can be the result of God’s (moral) wisdom. But, as Kant would have 
added, we should not yield to temptation whenever the consistency of 
reason is at stake.
Let us try to clarify Kant’s point with the help of some distinctions. 
Therefore, let us elucidate the term “wisdom” by using the phrase “orderly” 
and suggesting the following:
(O) The occurrence of an event-token e is an “orderly” occurrence if 
and only if there is a structure S such that the occurrence of e is a 
means m related to a certain end G and the means-end relation is 
governed by S for any event-type φ for which e is a token.
From here we can define two senses of “orderly” in order to come closer 
to Kant’s problem and verdict:
(NO) The occurrence of an event-token e is a natural-orderly occurrence 
if and only if there is a natural structure S* such that the occurrence 
of e is a means related to a certain end G* and the means-end 
relation is governed by S* for any event-type φ for which e is a 
token.
(MO) The occurrence of an event-token e is a moral-orderly occurrence if 
and only if there is a moral structure S** such that the occurrence 
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of e is a means m related to a certain end G** and the means-end 
relation is governed by S** for any event-type φ for which e is a 
token.
It is apparent that we are dealing with two different senses of “or-
derly” here. And this causes, as Kant underlines, further problems for 
our understanding. In particular, evil events (and first and foremost 
natural evils) seem to fulfill the requirements of NO. “Orderly,” in a 
moral understanding, means “good.” It seems to be obvious that evil 
events do not fulfill that standard. Yet, the solution of the problem of 
theodicy requires nothing less than the applicability of NO and MO 
to events in the universe once we believe that God is the ultimate 
“governor” of the universe. To believe in God as the wise governor of 
the universe implies, following Kant, that an event e is natural-orderly 
and moral-orderly simultaneously. Since we hesitate to call evil events 
moral-orderly and to simply conflate MO with NO, we are left with 
a puzzle: It seems to be the case that we don’t really understand what 
we mean by God’s wisdom and that we don’t understand how NO 
and MO are related to each other once we approach the problem 
from God’s point of view.
So, do we have to end our considerations at this point? Admittedly, 
it is far from being intellectually satisfying to confess that the conceptual 
paths we follow are not made to lead us towards higher ground. But 
satisfaction, so Kant reminds us, is no intellectual motive at any rate. 
Why should we take any further steps? Why should we try to leave Kant 
behind? How can this be accomplished? The post-Kantian tradition 
could help us with a very bold piece of advice: There are questions 
that have to be answered, even if the answers are not in a position to 
count as ordinarily justifiable knowledge.24 These answers, presented in 
a speculative manner, have to be given to sustain the nature of reason 
itself. Since reason is in charge of integrating the plurality of experiences 
and concepts into the unity of a so-called unifying idea, reason will not 
get rid of the task of giving a well-developed answer, even to merely 
speculative questions. Speculative questions reveal patterns which indicate 
the necessity of conceptual unification. It would mean a threat to reason 
24 Cf. Dieter Henrich, “Grund und Gang spekulativen Denkens,” in Bewußtes Leben: 
Untersuchungen zum Verhältnis von Subjektivität und Metaphysik, ed. Dieter Henrich 
(Stuttgart: Reclam, 1988), 85–138.
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itself if we were to leave the gap between the concepts involved (the 
connection of NO and MO and God’s wisdom) completely unabridged, 
since we have to understand ourselves as unified and unifying identities, 
and since we experience the necessity of combining so-called technical, 
event-related wisdom with pure moral, action-related wisdom through 
the fact that we are embodied persons, “minds dipped in matter and 
matter dipped in spirit.” We are inhabitants of both the natural and 
the moral realm. The same is true for the problem of theodicy: We are 
in need of unifying concepts to bridge the difference between pure 
natural and pure moral wisdom, as we do in other areas of theistic 
concept-formation, to bridge the gap between causality and teleology, 
bet ween agents and events.
Still, Kant’s warnings seem to be valid: Since we are in no position to 
explain the meaning — the meaning relative to a divine perspective — of 
single events and their contribution to a presumed ultimate goal of the 
universe, our considerations must remain somewhat speculative and 
fragile. In other words: We might only be able to point to goal-types γ for 
event-types φ by referring to a very speculatively described superstructure 
S’ (which must then be portrayed as something that unifies the moral 
and the natural realm), but we might not be able to indicate the concrete 
means-end-function G(m) = e for a concrete (evil) event-token e.25 For the 
sake of a label, let’s call the restrictedness of our abilities “Kant’s ghost,” 
who might haunt us every once in a while.
Overestimated Strategies
Two highly advanced strategies, which claim to offer profound reasons 
for negating sentence (6) in the atheist’s argument, turn out to have 
the same problem in common. At a certain point, both the Free-Will-
Theodicy and the No-Better-World-Theodicy deal unavoidably with 
modal operators. This is apparent for the No-Better-World-Theodicy 
25 Especially the latter is the more important concern for a First Person Perspective 
on natural evil. In the light of a certain catastrophe one is inclined to ask: Why did this 
happen to me, why did it happen now? The occurrence of certain evil-tokens is part of the 
questions we ask when we face the problem of theodicy from a First Person Perspective, 
as opposed to only from a Third-Person-Perspective. 
133theodicy and the divine access to the universe
as this is presented in Friedrich Hermanni’s book.26 It is not so obvious 
for FWD unless we take a closer look at the topological architecture of 
their argument: The Free-Will-Theodicy tries to answer the question: 
“Why is there any evil in the world?” by pointing out that evil is a 
consequence of human freedom and that natural evil, which, of course, 
cannot be a consequence of human action, is the presupposition for 
inductively gained knowledge of natural laws and their influence on 
human intention, action and will.27 The Free-Will-Defense is connected 
to a Laws-of-Nature-defense in the end.
Yet FWD has, as one could call it, a problem with divine morality. 
Whenever they are asked: “Why does God not intervene in the course 
of nature?” the Free-Will-Theorist has to answer: The only reason why 
God does not intervene is because of his respect for human freedom and 
his desire to guarantee it. The existence of freedom (to be more precise: 
the possibility of carrying out free acts) is a higher value than any stage 
of the world that would be a result of God’s initiative in protecting us 
from the bad consequences our actions bring about. But, one might ask, 
would not the horrifying amount of suffering experienced during the 
Holocaust and the Second World War, at the very least, provide a certain 
context in which the value of freedom would be reasonably exceeded by 
the value of compassion? Wouldn’t a reasonable being have turned from 
non-intervention to intervention, guided by the value of compassion under 
circumstances where human cruelty endangers the conditions of freedom 
itself ? Wouldn’t it have been a low price for God to pay to support Graf 
von Stauffenberg’s attack on Hitler with better effort, even if it may have 
been God’s intention not to bring about too many miracles, which have 
the tendency to turn a human being’s “will to believe” into the force of 
assent to knowledge?28 Even if God wanted to stay behind the scenery, 
26 Cf. Friedrich Hermanni, Das Böse und die Theodizee: Eine philosophisch-theologische 
Grund legung, (Gütersloh: Kaiser, 2002).
27 Cf. Richard Swinburne, The Existence of God, 2nd edit. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
2004), 236–272.
28 The No-Enforcement-of-Faith-Principle (NEFP) is a very tricky principle. It can 
be misused in a number of ways. One example is the creationist’s response to the material 
evidence scientists put forward to justify a Darwinian theory of evolution. The creationist 
might point out that this evidence was placed in the soil of the earth by God himself in 
order to make it harder for us to believe since, otherwise, the handwriting of the creator 
would have been too obvious and we would have been “forced” to believe in God. Well, 
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he could have done so very easily by hidden, i.e. unobservable, effects of 
his power. If any Free-Will-Theorist tries to answer the question why 
the value of freedom is always (and this implies: regardless of any special 
circumstances29) higher than the value of compassion, he/she cannot help 
but declaring, at last, that God’s specific intentions and preferences are 
a mystery. In the end the Free-Will-Theodicy collapses into a Mystery-
Theodicy by pointing to the incompatibility between human and divine 
values.
Furthermore, the problem of natural evil is not touched at all by any 
declaration of God’s respect for human freedom. If natural evil is a result 
it is hard to see whether NEFP is really needed — given a careful analysis of the act of 
faith as an act of human freedom and human autonomy. But what is more disturbing 
about NEFP is that one could be forced to assume that God willingly plays tricks with 
us in order not to violate NEFP. It might be noteworthy to point out that such an idea 
is unacceptable within a Catholic framework in relation to the concept of God. Within 
such a framework the idea that God is the source of reason (including human reason) is 
still powerful. A God who willingly deludes human beings in their endeavours, including 
(scientific) reasoning, seems to be a highly problematic idea. But, of course, this remark 
does not prove that NEFP is wrong. It just points to certain unwelcome consequences 
arising from it. For the application of NEFP to outcomes of divine action see Klaus 
von Stosch, Einführung in die Systematische Theologie (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 
2006), 85. Von Stosch’s use of NEFP seems to be necessary to keep the “epistemological” 
freedom of the act of belief. On the other side, if God’s action is ambiguous and does not 
produce evidential clarity then God’s action cannot be distinguished from non-action (at 
least from an epistemological point of view). But then, do we have any criteria to identify 
God’s actions at all?
29 It might be noteworthy to mention that even in a secular context — the context 
of legal enforcement of governmental power — almost everybody would agree to the 
legitimacy of restricting human freedom whenever a greater good (the well being of others, 
an un-endangered performance of justice etc.) is at stake. It seems to be the case that 
the freedom of a mass murderer has more value according to a FWD than the freedom 
of the victim that falls prey to the murderer. To avoid these consequences FWD has to 
embrace a version of “open theism” which consequently denies divine foreknowledge 
and, therefore, would have to point to the risky situation an omnipotent being ( that is 
deprived of foreknowledge) would have to face if it didn’t bind itself strictly to a policy 
of non-intervention. But such a God — as contemporary critics of open theism point 
out — would be poorer than any human being that finds itself called to compassion and, 
therefore, intervention. See von Stosch 2006, 55, FN 111. Von Stosch seems to embrace 
open theism although his appreciation is expressed within the context of a temporalist 
notion of God’s eternity. For “open theism” compare Clark Pinnock et alii, The Openness 
of God: A Biblical Challenge to the Traditional Understanding of God (Downers Grove: Inter 
Varsity Press, 1994).
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of the laws of nature God has “designed” for the universe why is it that 
God could not come up with “better” (let’s say: less “bloodthirsty”) ones? 
And if natural evils aren’t by any means strictly logical implications of the 
laws of nature, but occasional occurrences of events which are in accordance 
with these laws, why does God not intervene at least at certain points in 
history to prevent the total extinction of species or the killing of people 
instead of sacrificing them to the blind powers of nature? 30 Is it valid to 
say, as some philosophers and theologians do, that the laws of nature are 
a presupposition of human freedom?31
But if freedom in nature is a prerequisite for human freedom, then it 
seems unavoidable for us to overstretch the notion of “freedom” a little 
bit — applying the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (which is valid for 
human libertarian freedom) — to development in nature and to the entities 
that are involved in this development.32 It is clear that PT’s metaphysics 
(in a Whiteheadian sense) could support such a move, but would FWD 
be willing to sign off on that as well?
Let us focus once more on the above mentioned claim that natural 
evils are unavoidable. Any adherent of FWD is more or less forced to 
say that:
1) Natural evils are a result of the Laws of Nature — of those laws 
which
2) God chose to ensure the possibility of human freedom.
30 Cf. Hoerster 2007, 94.
31 For this position compare von Stosch 2006, 264 and 268.
32 The overstretching of the notion of “freedom” has to be justified, of course. Per 
se the application of PAP to non-human nature seems to induce category-mistakes 
unavoidably. This is part of the reason why process metaphysics have to come up with an 
almost extravagant vocabulary. But neither a neologistic understanding of freedom nor 
the overstretched application of PAP will justify the idea that the laws of nature that allow 
certain natural evils are a necessary prerequisite for human freedom. These maneuvers are 
only tools and need the support of another principle. It would have to be the idea of an 
Impossibility of Emergent Attributes (IEA). IEA plays a basic role in a naturalistic and 
materialistic explanation of human consciousness. It is used to question the non-physical 
nature of mental phenomena. In the hands of PT, IEA would become a reverse tool 
to implement a pan-psychistic ontology which allows the ascription of certain mental 
qualities, phenomena, and attributes to non-human entities. IEA itself is, in the end, based 
on the intuition of the homogeneity and the unity of everything that exists. 
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It is, at first glance, not so easy to explain what one could mean by “result,” 
although this seems to be the cornerstone of 1). “Result” is a very ambigu-
ous term. To illustrate this let us take a look at an analogy: After extensive 
grocery-shopping, I take a look at the bill. I might get the impression that 
the result is shocking or, at least, disturbing. The bill is in a way the result 
of laws of mathematics (very primitive ones: simple laws of algebra and 
calculation). The final number on the bill, however, is the product of my 
undisciplined shopping behavior; it is the product of certain events and 
the application of mathematical laws. The same is true for natural evils. If 
we want to know why there is natural evil in the world (take a hurricane 
or an earthquake as examples), we won’t be satisfied with an answer that 
points to the laws of nature. The evil in question is the product of certain 
events which served as antecedents of a causal connection that is based 
on the laws of nature. The natural evil that bothers us is not the product 
of the presupposed law of causality itself. A comparable ambiguity can 
be found in claim 2): What does it mean to say that the laws of nature 
that include the possibilities of natural evil are presuppositions of human 
freedom? Presumably, claim 2) alludes to the “necessity” of chance and 
occasion or — in other words — the “necessity of possibilities.” However, 
this answer does not satisfy anybody who wants to know why a certain 
event in nature is a presupposition of human freedom or, to be a bit more 
precise, a necessary presupposition for the possibility and development 
of human freedom. The laws of nature and the realm of possibilities 
would still remain untouched and unquestioned if none of the natural 
catastrophes we are able to recall ever happened.
We can use a more prominent terminology to describe the problems 
of a Natural-Law-Defense: Let N be a set of possible Worlds which are 
possible by laws of nature. Presumably, it could be agreed that N is smaller 
than L, which is the set of all logically possible worlds, since we don’t 
have good reason to believe that N is co-extensional with L. Now, for all 
worlds wα , wβ , … wω in N, natural evil is just a probability, which means 
that natural evil occurs in some worlds of N, but not in all worlds. To put 
it in a nutshell: Whenever natural evils occur in wα they do not occur 
in, for example, wω (otherwise the occurrence of natural evils would be 
natural-law-necessary). If wα is identical with our actual world α, which 
is a world in which many natural evils have occurred and will occur, and 
if it is true that evil does not occur in, for example, wω , then the question 
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must arise why wα is the actualized world and not wω. If an answer to 
that question points to the idea that α would be identical to wω only if 
God had interfered with the course of wα several times, then in saying 
this, we would have to deal with the very same question that bothered us 
while we took a look at the value of human freedom within the context 
of FWD: Does God have good reasons for his non-intervention? Why 
is God interested in having wα as α and not any other world or, at least, 
not wω? There is nothing in the way N is furnished that prevents wω from 
being identical with α. These questions and remarks fit precisely with 
Immanuel Kant’s verdict. Kant would have repeated his core message: We 
may explain certain atrocities in nature as the outcome of the design of the 
laws of nature; nevertheless, we don’t understand why a specific atrocity 
had to occur and what the specific event’s position really is within the 
whole “story” of the universe (a story that means to “ensure” the outcome 
of human freedom). The situation becomes more complicated again once 
we ask whether a certain evil event in nature could have been prevented 
by divine intervention. Kant’s “ghost,” the problem of ambiguity and 
non-understanding, is starting to “haunt” us again.
In contrast to FWD the No-Better-World-Theory argues in a more 
aprioristic mode because the unsurpassable quality of the actual world is 
deduced from divine attributes only: If God exemplifies unsurpassable 
greatness, it is impossible for Him not to bring the best of all possible 
worlds into existence. Therefore, the actual world α must be the best of 
all possible worlds. Since our actual world includes evil and suffering, the 
events producing or carrying evil must be regarded as integral parts of the 
course of the best possible world. Friedrich Hermanni tries to support this 
view by declaring that the chain of events in the actual world is logically 
necessary for our world to be the best of all possible worlds.33 At this point, 
one can see that the special problems of the No-Better-World-Theory are 
somewhat easier to identify: The empirically describable form of the actual 
world α seems to be of no interest to this theory. In other words: This 
theory expresses an extraordinary blindness to the suffering in the actual 
world. Furthermore, one will uncover logical problems in what Hermanni 
wants to tell us: To regard a specific chain of events as a logical necessity 
(translating this claim into the language of possible-worlds) implies that 
33 Cf. Hermanni 2002, 266–291.
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apart from the actual world α, no other world, in which the mentioned 
chain of events does not occur, is an element of the set of possible worlds 
(which must mean logically possible worlds) L. But, why must we think 
that there cannot be any other world equipped with alternative chains of 
events? If there is no reason to restrict alternative courses of events, then 
the course of events in our actual world α cannot be declared a logical 
necessity; perhaps one might call it a necessary condition for realizing 
the end God intended to be realized. And perhaps this interpretation 
is more adequate to Leibniz’ basic idea, but necessity-related-to-aim is 
just functional and not logical necessity. Furthermore, one could argue as 
follows: As long as we are able to conceive alternative courses of events, 
there are alternative courses of events which constitute other possible 
worlds. And as long as we still have the ability to conceive alternative 
chains of events, bringing about less suffering and evil, we can imagine an 
alternative possible world which is better than the actual world. Although 
conceivability might not always be a good criterion of possibility, it might, 
at least, do the job of overriding the assumption that evil is a necessary 
component of our actual world α. On a more intuitive basis, it is hard to 
see how the enormous amount of evil in our actual world can contribute to 
the marvelous rank it seems to have in God’s eyes — given that alternative 
courses of events could have been set into motion.34
Discussions like this, moreover, reveal that Kant’s “ghost” continues 
to haunt us: The No-Better-Worlds-Theory actually presupposes that 
worlds are comparable on the basis of some sort of goodness or quality. 
But this causes a problem that leads to a dichotomy of categorization 
which resembles Kant’s verdict. The precise cause is a set-theoretical 
problem. Within ethical discussions and with respect to the problem 
34 Of course, the problem of natural evil is usually approached from a different angle 
as well. Swinburne offers some additional motives to “defend” the existence of natural evil: 
1) Natural evils are a way to improve our inductive ways of gaining knowledge. 2) Natural 
evils are an important occasion to perform acts of mercy and compassion; and they provide 
occasions to perform super-erogatory acts. Cf. Richard Swinburne, Providence and the 
Problem of Evil (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), 160–192. Although Swinburne is right in 
pointing to these aspects it is still hard to see how this strategy might justify the number 
of natural evils and their rather disastrous consequences. Furthermore, justifications like 
the above-mentioned approach natural evils from a Third-Person-Perspective only. For 
the victims of natural catastrophes and terminal diseases the indicated defense strategies 
may have no bearing, no relevance, and no impact. 
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of theodicy, the use of the terms “good” or “better” is related to actions 
and events that are implied by actions.35 Events are instances of states 
of affairs and are, therefore, elements of worlds (worlds seen as sets 
in a very broad understanding of possible-worlds-semantics). It is not 
without reason to think that qualifications which are ascribable to 
elements of sets are, nevertheless, not ascribable to the set in question. 
For example, the set of all red entities in Berlin is not red. It seems to 
involve a category mistake if we want to use the mentioned qualification 
for both the elements and the set. If these preliminary considerations 
are right, then we bump into the above mentioned problem or become 
haunted by Kant’s “ghost.” The problem we are facing has the structure 
of a dilemma. Either:
We are not permitted to call a world good or better for set-theore- (1) 
tical-reasons.
Or, we are permitted to use the terms in question and we can call (2) 
the actual world the “best of all possible worlds.” We would then 
have to clarify the “goodness” of the actual world by determining 
G(m) = α [in contrast to, let’s say, the G(m) for other possible worlds 
wβ, wγ … wω].
So, even if we can sneak around 1) Kant’s ghost will catch us at alternative 
2). We simply have no clue why our actual world (with all its atrocities etc.) 
is the best of all possible worlds. We have no idea what the specific ends 
of the atrocities are, and what the overall end of the course of events in 
the actual world really is. Without such a clue, the comparison of worlds 
remains useless. Thus, the claim that this world is the best of all possible 
worlds is nothing else but a claim.
What kind of problem do the above-mentioned strategies have in 
common? Both strategies, in one way or the other, share the view that it 
is necessary to restrict God’s doing and deciding by an appeal to “certain 
necessities.” To answer the question: “Why did God not intervene?” both 
theories point to a certain limitation of omnipotence. The only restricting 
modality FWD can offer is some kind of moral necessity with respect to 
human freedom: To enable human freedom, God is morally obliged not 
35 Cf. Hoerster 2007, 90.
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to intervene in the course of the actual world. With regard to natural evil 
Free-Will-Defense-theorists are tempted to base the validity of natural 
laws on logical necessity. But this is just a vague hypothesis.36 In contrast, 
the No-Better-World-Theory prefers logical necessity to explain why God 
couldn’t change the course of the actual world by intervention. But, as 
already noted, this assertion is hardly convincing because to exclude any 
alternative chains of events from being realized in other possible worlds 
means to restrict the sphere of possibility and to narrow it down to a 
very small set, including the actual world α as the only element. Since 
one may find no reason for doing so and since every restriction of the 
same sort would lead to a collapse of possible-worlds-talk, the strategy 
in question is a dead end.
Despite these problems, both strategies reveal an important aspect: 
To accommodate the question: “Why did God not intervene?” every 
answer has to deal with some sort of limitation of God’s omnipotence. 
How can this be achieved? A necessary, but not completely satisfying, 
starting point would have to admit that God’s decisions are restricted 
by logical impossibility.37 For example, God is not able to create round 
squares. Even the widest interpretation of omnipotence would concede 
that God’s omnipotence is limited by God’s nature. Therefore everyone 
who is asked whether God has the ability to sin38 can answer very clearly: 
“No.” If we call this kind of necessity a metaphysical or conceptual necessity 
36 Cf. von Stosch 2006, 259–269. Von Stosch examines the idea that the Laws of 
Nature could not have been different from what they are as a matter of fact. Although 
there is no scientific support for a “No-Better-Laws-of-Nature-Theory” (NBLNT), he 
wants to stick to this idea, at least for the sake of a hypothesis. But even a merely 
hypothetical use of a NBLNT is nothing else but a sophisticated version of a No-Better-
Worlds-Theory. Any criticism that challenges a No-Better-World-Theory will challenge 
the NBLNT as well. 
37 As a basic introduction to the problems and ranges of omnipotence see Anthony 
Kenny, The God of the Philosophers (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), chapter 7; cf. Armin 
Kreiner, Das wahre Antlitz Gottes — oder was wir meinen, wenn wir Gott sagen (Freiburg 
i.B.: Herder-Verlag, 2006), 308–316. 
38 Usually William of Occam is referred to as a representative of a fairly wide inter-
pretation of omnipotence. However, detailed research supports a more careful assessment. 
Cf. Hubert Schröcker, Das Verhältnis der Allmacht Gottes zum Kontradiktionsprinzip nach 
Wilhelm vom Ockham (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 2003) 200–206, 502–508; for the outline 
of the problem cf. Nelson Pike, “Omnipotence and God’s Ability to Sin,” American 
Philosophical Quarterly 6 (1969): 208–216.
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we can add: God’s omnipotence is limited by metaphysical necessity as 
well. Metaphysical necessity is a much stronger modality than moral 
necessity or natural-law-necessity, although metaphysical necessity is 
somewhat weaker than logical necessity. Since logical necessity is only 
formal, metaphysical necessity is the strongest content-providing modality 
we can propose. So, if we managed to furnish an argument dealing with 
metaphysical necessity with regard to God’s non-intervention, we would 
be able to deal with the problem of God’s responsibility, despite the 
existence of evil.
God’s Relation to the World
Before we turn to the last part of our considerations it is important 
to develop an overview of the differences and degrees of possibilities 
(and, along the same lines, impossibilities and necessities). Although in 
philosophical literature one will discover a highly advanced debate on 
how to distinguish (or not to distinguish) the spheres of possibilities, it 
is hardly deniable — at least on a more intuitive basis — that there are 
significant gradual distances between logical, metaphysical and natural-
law-possibilities if one is willing to base possibility on conceivability (but, 
of course, not every philosopher is willing to agree with this).39 In contrast, 
moral possibility or impossibility is a vague conception. Its meaning and 
range can be strengthened only if we anchor it in conceptual or metaphysi-
cal necessity.
Let us illustrate the extension of possibilities with the help of some 
examples that offer insight by approaching the opposite direction: 
impossibility. We can distinguish logical impossibility from conceptual 
impossibility, conceptual impossibility from mere metaphysical impos-
sibility, and metaphysical impossibility from laws-of nature-impossibility. 
Different possibilities and impossibilities represent different kinds of 
39 For further discussion see Stephen Yablo, “Is Conceivability a Guide to Possibility?” 
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (1993): 1–42; Tamar Szabó Gendler and 
John Hawthorne, eds., Conceivability and Possibility (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002); 
Uwe Meixner, The Theory of Ontic Modalities (Frankfurt and Paris: Ontos-Verlag, 2006), 
40–52, 152–156. 
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limitations within the logical sphere of possibility.40 Take, for example, 
the following propositions:
# 1: It is not possible to claim p and ¬p 
in the same proposition.
Logical 
impossibility
# 2: It is not possible for a dolphin 
to walk around.
Conceptual 
impossibility
# 3: It is not possible for a (temporally 
located) entity to vanish every five 
minutes, then be brought into 
existence one minute later.
Metaphysical 
impossibility
# 4: It is not possible to travel faster 
than light.
Laws-of-nature-
impossi bility
It is easy to see that the different degrees of possibility and impossibility 
are the outcome of conceivability and inconceivability on the one hand 
and some sort of content and input on the other hand. The claim that p 
and not-p are true simultaneously violates the most basic rule of com-
munication. These rules have to be obeyed even before we start to think 
40 See Ernest J. Lowe, The Possibility of Metaphysics: Substance, Identity, and Time 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998) 16–21.
Logical possibility 
Natural-law-possibility 
Metaphysical 
possibility 
Conceptual possi-
bility 
Possible worlds in different 
“modal” distances 
  
 ACTUAL WORLD 
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about conceivability. The fact that dolphins don’t walk is not a matter 
of conceivability either, but rather a presupposition of conceivability 
insofar as conceivability needs stable concepts. Conceptual stability is 
the architecture that stabilizes the force of metaphysical necessity and 
impossibility, respectively. On the other side, metaphysical necessity is 
sensitive to the world and the universe as it is. This implies that we could 
imagine another world with other metaphysical laws. Nevertheless, a 
universe with different metaphysical laws would be disastrous for our 
concepts. In other words: It is the fact that metaphysical necessity is seated 
between concepts on the one side and input on the other side — input 
stemming from the ways in which we experience the world- which makes 
this kind of necessity so interesting. In contrast, natural-law-necessity 
does not exclude the imagination of another universe with different laws 
of nature, even if the metaphysical laws might be the very same. A world 
with different laws of nature might be un-inhabitable, but it would not 
be disastrous for the concept and metaphysics itself. If we discuss moral 
necessity we might, at first glance, think that the status of moral necessity 
is questionable.41
In a purified form, it should be a conceptual or a metaphysical necessity. 
This step is crucial for the problem of theodicy: As long as the limitation 
of God’s omnipotence isn’t based on conceptual or metaphysical necessity, 
there is no good reason for God’s non-intervention. As a matter of fact, 
this is precisely the missing link in any Free-Will-Theodicy: to explain 
God’s non-intervention in terms of metaphysical necessity (without 
41 Given the lively discussion of modalities with regard to their conceivability it seems 
hazardous to stick to the above introduced distinctions. Maybe only logical necessity/
possibility and nomological (laws-of-nature-) necessity/possibility should survive a process 
of further cleaning. Meixner’s base-theory of modality would allow me to introduce the 
above mentioned examples as pointers to different bases (b1 to b4) of modality and to 
develop different necessities and possibilities thereafter (q1p to q4p and ◊1p to ◊4p). 
While Meixner himself tends to reduce the number of bases significantly, I don’t see 
why the above mentioned examples wouldn’t support a more fine-grained distinction of 
modalities especially if we, as Meixner recommends, want to balance the epistemological, 
semantical, and metaphysical aspects of modal expressions. Cf. Meixner 2006, 83, 154–155. 
But I am sure that “modal skeptics” are frightened if they take a look at the multiplication 
of modal degrees I have indicated. Maybe we should point out that any further discussion 
has to clarify if there is any form of modality beyond logical necessity/possibility and, if 
so, whether what remains is reducible to nomological necessity/possibility. 
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thereby destroying God’s divinity). To accomplish this, two strategies 
can be offered:
The first strategy still favors a A) classic concept of God which, neverthe-
less, includes a strong connection between divine will and divine 
essence. The latter has to serve as a basis for a restriction of divine 
omnipotence.
The second strategy is in favor of a more or less B) idealistic notion of 
God which forces us to rethink the usual notions of divine action 
and to replace these concepts with notions which hold that God 
cannot be conceived as capable of interfering immediately in the 
course of the world.
Strategy A) remains within the framework of FWD. One could find 
hints in Aquinas’s theology that support the underlying idea: God’s will 
is somehow bound by His essence; it is, however, not bound by some sort 
of necessity but by “fittingness.”42 Nevertheless, fittingness creates a very 
specific form of necessity:
(NF) The realization of e is most fitting if and only if its non-realization 
is logically possible and if its non-realization severely jeopardizes 
the dignity of the agent that has the power to bring about e.
To arrive at a strategy which can cope with the problem of theodicy we 
have to establish a modification of NF, namely, NFD and its comple-
ment NFD*:
(NFD) The realization of an event-type φ is most fitting if and only if 
its non-realization is logically possible and if its non-realization 
severely jeopardizes the dignity of the divine agent that has the 
power to bring about tokens of φ.
42 The most important example can be found in Aquinas’s treatises on the Incarnation. 
Although, in his theory, each person of the Trinity could have become God incarnate it 
was most “fitting” that the eternal Word became God incarnate because of the attributes 
ascribed to the eternal Word. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae III q. 3 a. 8.
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(NFD*) The non-realization of an event-type φ is most fitting if and only 
if its realization is logically possible and if its realization severely 
jeopardizes the dignity of the divine agent that has the power 
to bring about tokens of φ.
Classic Theology has argued that NFD* holds (as a general principle to 
describe the relation between God and the world) that, if God’s creation 
is perfect, it does not really require specific acts of divine intervention. 
Frequent acts of intervention would violate God’s dignity because they 
would prove the natural order to be imperfect. Another application of 
NFD* makes the pros and the range of this principle more obvious: 
Could God perform miracles that are un-witnessed and irrelevant for 
mankind (like chasing atoms at the surface of Jupiter)? Although there 
is no conceptual limitation that excludes God from performing such 
acts, these acts might go against God’s dignity. This would be sufficient 
reason for God not to perform those acts. NFD* serves as a basis for a 
de-facto-limitation of God’s omnipotence.
NFD* presents a sort of necessity, which is weaker than conceptual 
and, at first glance, metaphysical necessity. To lift it to the level of a 
metaphysical necessity/impossibility one would have to say that God’s 
dignity is, in fact, God’s essence. While dignity is something humans 
might lose without (unfortunately) losing too much, in God’s case, dignity 
would be something God could not lose without losing his very nature 
and essence. Although this might strengthen the credibility of NFD* 
and the range of its applicability and possibly transform NFD* from a 
de-facto-limitation of divine omnipotence into a de-jure-limitation, one 
might still have trouble thinking of direct acts of divine intervention as 
acts that would instantiate φ-types of events as precluded by NFD*. In 
other words: It is hard to see why God would lose his dignity if he would 
perform acts of intervention (motivated by nothing less than mercy and 
compassion).
This is precisely the reason why strategy B) wants to take a step further. 
Its basic claim is a metaphysical limitation of God’s omnipotence with 
respect to direct acts of divine intervention. This strategy seeks to find 
a basis which is significantly stronger than NFD*. But what kind of 
principle could serve as a basis for this step? Let us assume that the idea 
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strategy B) is looking for might be some sort of Transcendent-Being-
Principle:
(TBP)  A transcendent and absolute being cannot directly intervene in 
the course of the world.
Strategy B) has a huge impact on a more classic understanding of God 
as a personal being. There are benefits to this strategy as well: As long as 
we think it might be possible that God has the power to intervene in the 
course of the world any time He wants, we are left with a challenging 
problem: Either God is not benevolent at all or He is not a reasonable 
agent because His interventions do not follow a rule or pattern. Strategy 
B) wants to establish an alternative view: God does not intervene directly 
in the course of the world. Saying this, one might ask whether strategy 
B) supports a more or less subtle form of deism.
To answer this question and to figure out where the proposed idea 
stands on the spectrum of available divine-action-theories, let us introduce 
a conceptual framework of possible concepts dealing with the idea of God’s 
action or intervention, respectively.43 If we take a look at contemporary 
and classic philosophical treatises on the matter in question, we can 
distinguish seven different approaches44:
43 A very good overview of the debates concerning God’s action in the world can be 
found in Reinhold Bernhardt, Was heißt “Handeln Gottes”? Eine Rekonstruktion der Lehre 
von der Vorsehung (Gütersloh: Kaiser, 1999); Ute Lockmann, Dialog zweier Freiheiten: 
Studien zur Verhältnisbestimmung von göttlichem Handeln und Gebet (Innsbruck: Tyrolia, 
2004) 167 –252; Kreiner 2006, 312–342; von Stosch 2006, 23–85.
44 Von Stosch offers a different system of categories. He distinguishes between a 
personal, a sapiential and a representational model of divine action. These distinctions were 
established by Bernhardt 1999, 313–442. The personal model regards God as a personal 
agent. The second model thinks of God as somebody who established the order of the 
world, which might contain certain elements that may affect human agents (without 
overriding their freedom). The representational model thinks of certain events in the 
universe as icons, symbols and images of divine presence. In addition to Bernhardt, von 
Stosch included a distinction between the personal model of action and a “causative” 
model of efficiency, borrowing from Lockmann 2004. Cf. von Stosch 2006, 23–85. My 
distinction between seven models includes von Stosch’s delineation but uses a simpler 
starting point, i.e. the basic difference between direct and indirect divine intervention. The 
difference between “personal” and “causative” models of agency is not very clear. And, as 
von Stosch points out himself, the distinction between “sapiential” and “representational” 
is not so clear either. The spectrum of seven approaches I have provided might be easier 
to grasp and easier to apply. 
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Straightforward Non-Interventionism(1) 
Idealistic Non-Interventionism(2) 
Process Interventionism(3) 
Semi-Non-Interventionism(4) 
Semi-Interventionism(5) 
Interventionism(6) 
Straightforward Omni-causation(7) 
Most certainly, answer (1) is a version of deism if this approach claims 
that God does not intervene in the course of the world and does not add 
anything further. Usually, any theologian who holds (1) includes some 
modifications that point to an indirect influence of God’s will45 on the 
outcome and end of the world.46 Eventually, modifications like that turn 
(1) into something which comes closer to (4) and (5).
Model (2) is called “idealistic” because it has some affinity with ap-
proaches coming from German Idealism and was, as a matter of fact, spelled 
out by theologians that were inspired by German Idealism. This theory 
claims that God does not and cannot intervene in the course of the world 
because He is an absolute being. Therefore, approach (2) asks us to replace 
the phrase “intervention.” Instead, we should talk about God’s presence 
and about the means of representing the absolute in the world.47 Since the 
world participates in God, as approach (2) tells us, it is conceivable that 
God is present (i.e. represented) in the world without directly interfering 
45 One way to assure divine influence would be to say that God set up a master-plan 
for the direction his creation would take. But such an idea could destroy the intentions 
of strategy B) if the master-plan is deterministic because one might wonder why God’s 
master-plan did not entail an event that, let’s just say, killed Hitler before he became 
chancellor. Apparently, a master-plan-theory has to be subject to some sort of FWD. In 
this case, we should stop talking about a divine “master”-plan. Maybe, using analogies, 
it might be more appropriate to talk about certain “devices” God implanted in the 
universe — devices that point to God’s will or that help us act on God’s behalf. 
46 Cf. Maurice Wiles, God’s Action in the World (London: SCM Press, 1986); for further 
discussions see Richard Sturch, The New Deism: Divine Intervention and the Human 
Condition (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990). In order to be fair one should take a 
closer look at the richness of Wiles’ position. It is far from being a straightforward deism. 
Wiles proposes the idea of a divine plan that starts rolling at the beginning of creation. 
For a more detailed examination cf. von Stosch 2006, 91–97.
47 Cf. Bernhardt 1999, 422–435.
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with the course of the universe.48 Questions that might arise from this 
perspective are concerned with the meaning of action-predicates, which 
are usually ascribed to God. If idealistic non-interventionism were true, 
how could we make sense of those action-predicates that seem to be a 
crucial part of religious language and any religious heritage?
Approach (3) has to deal with the same sort of problems since it tells us 
that God cannot intervene in the course of the world because he “emptied” 
his sovereign omnipotence right from the start in order to enable the free 
development of the world. Instead, as this version of divine action theory 
underlines, God tries, with His patient love, to “persuade” and “convince” 
the world to follow His intended course, in order to ensure a generally 
good end for the world.49
In contrast, model (4) comes closer to a traditional concept of God 
in saying that God cannot intervene in the course of the world since He 
is an absolute being and that He, nevertheless, can influence the world 
with the help of a “supportive web” of secondary causes.50 It is a further, 
rather metaphysical question how God as the first cause is related to the 
secondary causes in a way that maintains the integrity of God’s intention 
and will, as well as the identity and partial independence of those instances 
that serve as secondary causes. Model (4), however, can collapse into a 
theory of divine omni-causation.
Problems like that are of no concern for version (5) since this version 
sticks to the idea of a possible divine intervention. However, God’s 
48 Cf. Peter C. Hodgson, God in History. Shapes of Freedom (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 
1989); cf. the further discussion of idealistic positions in von Stosch 2006, 76–85. A very 
subtle theological version of idealistic-non-interventionism can be found in Hansjürgen 
Verweyen, Gottes letztes Wort: Grundriß der Fundamentaltheologie, 3rd edit. (Regensburg: 
Pustet-Verlag, 2000), 154–166. Verweyen’s position is inspired by Fichte; cf. therefore 
Johann G. Fichte, “Die Wissenschaftslehre in ihrem allgemeinen Umrisse (1810), ” in 
Fichtes Werke, Vol. 2 (Berlin: de Gruyter), §§ 1–3. 
49 Cf. John Cobb and David R. Griffin, Process Theology: An Introductory Exposition 
(Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1976), 95–110.
50 Cf. Béla Weissmahr, “Bemerkungen zur Frage der Möglichkeit eines nicht durch 
Geschöpfe vermittelten göttlichen Wirkens in der Welt,” Zeitschrift für Katholische Theologie 
96 (1974): 126–130; a traditional hint in favor of this position can be found in Thomas 
Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I q. 103 a. 3 — a. 6 and q. 104 a. 2; Thomas Aquinas, Summa 
contra Gentiles lib. I, 67–79. Theologically this view has been adopted by K. Rahner. Cf. 
Karl Rahner, Grundkurs des Glaubens: Einführung in den Begriff des Christentums (Freiburg 
i.B.: Herder-Verlag, 1976), 93–96.
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apparent non-intervention has to be justified. This can be done in two 
ways. One way would be to explain God’s seeming lack of intervention 
by saying that the world would be a greater mess than it is if God did 
not act invisibly all the time. Although this is a theoretical possibility, it 
seems obvious that the amount of tragedies occurring in the world, does 
not really support this view. We could hardly call God a successful or 
reasonable agent, if He invisibly prevents many tragedies, while seem-
ingly failing to prevent, or even guide, so many others. Another way to 
support version (5) would be to say that, although God can intervene 
in the course of the world, He decided to refrain from intervention to 
ensure human freedom, for the sake of human freedom.51 If this were 
true, i.e. if God’s non-intervention were based on an initial decision only, 
then one is entitled to ask whether God is morally responsible for the 
effects of his non-intervention. As contemporary action theories might 
point out: Under certain circumstances, non-intervention resembles action 
if the person in question had the ability and the freedom to intervene 
and to alter the course of what happened, as a matter of fact, without 
intervention. The only way out for model (5) would be an adaptation 
of NFD*.
Model (6) runs into comparable problems when it claims that God 
can intervene and does so whenever He wants and adds that God has 
performed acts of intervention throughout history, and continues to do 
so.52 One might ask how we can detect single events of God’s intervention 
and, once we do so successfully, whether we might find some patterns 
of God’s intervention to help us figure out a more general divine plan 
or strategy that gives meaning to the events in the world (including the 
suffering in the world). In case we should not be able to come up with 
such a pattern, a backfiring question is waiting for us: Can we call God 
a reasonable agent? If we have no response to that question, wouldn’t we 
have to sign off on a mystery theology eventually?
Concept (7), however, embraces the mystery for the sake of a higher 
idea: God is the ultimate cause of everything — including every event and 
51 Cf. Keith Ward, Divine Action: Examining God’s Role in an Open and Emergent Universe 
(Philadelphia and London: Templeton Foundation Press 2007). 
52 Cf. William P. Alston, “Divine Action: Shadow or Substance,” in The God Who Acts: 
Philosophical and Theological Explorations, ed. Thomas F. Tracy (Philadelphia: University 
Park, 1994), 41–62.
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every state of affairs in the world. But this answer — emphasized by rather 
Calvinist authors — truly endangers human freedom. Of course, with the 
sacrifice of human freedom the problem of theodicy gets an entirely 
different outline. One might question if there is any chance to resolve it 
at all on the basis of (7). The only way out that version (7) would have is 
to declare everything that God causes “good” — even if the goodness is 
something that goes beyond our understanding.
The above-mentioned strategy B), which is based on TBP, would 
presumably present itself as a combination of divine action theories (2) 
and (4). The foundation of these theories is the idea that God cannot 
intervene directly in the course of the world. Nevertheless, since TBP does 
not exclude indirect actions or mediated effects of God’s will, some aspects 
of divine action can be preserved and even strengthened. Based on TBP, 
we could respond to the problem of theodicy as follows: To ask “Why 
doesn’t God intervene?” elicits the answer: Because of the metaphysical 
impossibility of the immediate occurrence of the absolute, inside the 
event-course of the non-absolute universe. Despite this impossibility, we 
can nevertheless talk of God’s presence by pointing, as some more or less 
idealistic divine-action-theorists do, to the shapes of freedom and love 
within the universe. But the appearances of these forms and shapes of 
the unrestricted are bound to the means that serve as a medium: Usually 
it is human beings who serve as the means to represent the absolute in 
the finite universe. So, God’s “mediate intervention” is observable at any 
time when, for instance, finite human courage turns into unrestricted love, 
and when conditioned duty turns into the unrestricted will to diminish 
suffering. This comes close to the idealistic idea that the primary place 
of God’s intervention is human conscience.53 On the other side: God 
cannot be present when humans refuse (based on their free will) to serve 
as the image of the absolute. At this point, it might be apparent that 
God’s presence in the world is metaphysically bound to human freedom. 
Nevertheless, some kind of mystery still remains: If God wanted to avoid 
evil, he would have had to refuse creating the world at all. But, in the 
words of classic theology, the non-existence of the world would be much 
worse than the existence of the actual world.
53 Cf. Johann G. Fichte, Ueber den Grund unseres Glaubens an eine göttliche Weltregierung, 
in Werke, Gesamtausgabe, Part I, Vol. 5 (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 
1977), 347–357.
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Nevertheless, TBP doesn’t say much about the occurrence of natural 
evils in the world. Expanding these concepts may be necessary to reach 
a more feasible point of departure. To arrive at an adequate perspective 
on nature, which helps us to come to terms with the problem of natural 
evils, we would have to think and imagine that the gift of freedom was 
spread out through the whole history of the universe. This is even more 
important if we want to have an answer to the problem of theodicy, 
especially, with respect to the problem of natural evil. As discussed earlier: 
It is not satisfying to say that natural evils are a result of natural laws; 
they are in accordance with these laws and are only in this respect the 
products of these laws. Once we see natural evil as a product of occasion 
as well, we cannot help but look at the atrocities in non-animated nature 
as a result of misguided possibilities. To “explain” this, we would have to 
turn to the rather speculative idea which not only holds that freedom is 
already part of non-animated nature but also that what one might call sin 
can be found in nature as well.54 Admittedly it sounds like nonsense to 
claim that a “quark” or “photon” makes some sort of decision. Perhaps we 
can soften the provocation if we, instead, propose that intentionality (in 
its most basic form as a mere tendency) is a constituent of the universe at 
every stage and level (e.g., to explain the strange phenomena of quantum 
mechanics, the category of “intentionality” is a rather promising basis). Yet, 
the combination of intentionality and freedom seems to be an implication 
of metaphysical or conceptual necessity. Even if we do not want to regard 
“quarks” and “photons” as living beings it might be worthwhile to look at 
the issue from a fresh perspective. To allude to Rahner’s famous words: 
Matter is frozen spirit.55 Along those lines one could say that matter is 
frozen intentionality and frozen freedom.
But, of course, one question remains: How can we support TBP? Is 
there any good reason to stick to it or even defend it and, therefore, to 
54 A comparable strategy can be found in Plantinga 1990, 153–155 where Plantinga 
discusses the idea that natural evils could be caused by nonhuman agents (spirits, demons). 
I don’t want to discuss the pros and cons of this idea. I just want to point to it as a strategy 
that tries to work out a synthesis between the idea of freedom on the one side and the 
problem of nature and natural evils on the other side. 
55 Cf. Karl Rahner, “Die Einheit von Geist und Materie im christlichen Glaubens-
verständnis,” in Schriften zur Theologie, Vol. 6, ed. Karl Rahner, (Einsiedeln, Zürich and 
Köln: Benzinger-Verlag, 1968), 185–214, 203. 
152 thomas schärtl
prefer strategy B) over strategy A)? TBP breathes the air of idealistic phi-
losophy; it is not hard to find a prominent supporter: F. Schleiermacher.56 
Before we take a closer look at Schleiermacher’s concept, it must be 
underlined that Schleiermacher does not make use of these ideas for 
the problem of theodicy. As a matter of fact, Schleiermacher presents 
a version of classic “privation-boni”-theodicy57 in combination with a 
more or less Protestant idea of divine omni-causation.58 Nevertheless, 
Schleiermacher’s remarks on the problem of immediate divine acts 
could help us to figure out the premises of TBP. In particular, two 
loosely connected trains of thought deserve our attention: Schleiermacher 
argues in favour of the dignity of the natural order of causes; his point 
is a subtle version of NFD*. He makes a distinction between absolute 
causes and finite causes — a distinction which might have an interest-
ing impact on the concept of divine action. Schleiermacher’s point of 
departure is an initial examination of divine omnipotence. He refers 
to some theological positions, which stress that the ability to perform 
extraordinary acts (such as immediate intervention by miracles) is a sign 
of divine omnipotence. Schleiermacher, however, seeks to defuse this 
impression. He underlines that this idea rests on a severe misconception: 
First of all, it presupposes a view of nature that regards nature and 
events, which are in accordance with the order or nature, as something 
that is not only devoid of God’s presence but is almost anti-divine. If 
God is truly sustaining the universe then nature cannot be without a 
divine signature.59 Secondly, to assume that certain acts of intervention 
are required to get the development of the universe back on track, 
would seriously bring into question divine omnipotence and divine 
omniscience: If God has foreknowledge (at least in a Molinist60 sense), 
then He could have been aware of the problems (caused by his creation, 
or by the laws of nature at work in his creation) and could have initially 
56 Cf. D. Friedrich E. Schleiermacher, Der christliche Glaube nach den Grundsätzen der 
Evangelischen Kir che im Zusammenhange dargestellt (1830/31), ed. Martin Redeker (Berlin 
and New York: de Gruyter, 1999), § 46.
57 For a discussion of the problems of this very classic approach to the problem of 
theodicy cf. Kreiner 1997, 125 –139.
58 Cf. Schleimeracher 1830/31, § 48.
59 Cf. ibid. § 47, 236.
60 Compare the discussion of this approach in Thomas Flint, Divine Providence: The 
Molinist Account (Ithaca and London: Oxford University Press, 1998), 11–71. 
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altered the outlines of the creation in order to avoid acts of immediate 
intervention.61 In other words: Immediate acts of intervention would 
disqualify God’s initial omnipotence and omniscience. Admittedly, some 
parts of Schleiermacher’s remarks sound a bit like a No-Better-World- or 
a No-Better-Laws-of-Nature-Theory. Only in this case, the connection 
between the world and God’s action is made a bit more explicit. But 
Schleiermacher offers a second, rather independent train of thoughts 
to make his point: What would be the implication of the idea that 
God, the absolute cause, could act within the context of natural, i.e. 
finite causes? Schleiermacher’s answer contains some important hints: 
If God, as the absolute cause, could act within the context of natural 
causes in order to bring about what cannot be brought about by natural 
causes (including finite persons such as human beings62), then God 
would destroy the order and connection of natural causes with grave 
consequences for the past and future. With respect to the past, the 
chain of natural causes would be interrupted and put on hold; with 
respect to the future, the course of events would be significantly altered 
and based on something that could not be found in the natural order 
of causes (including the actions of human persons).63 Furthermore, 
any action of an absolute cause is an act of creation. But to think of 
an act of creation as being a supernatural link in a chain of natural 
causes (including the actions of human persons), would undermine 
the integrity of this chain. Moreover, it would seriously bring into 
question its existence since an act of creation would jeopardize, if not 
annihilate, what may have existed before.64 Schleiermacher’s remarks 
can help us to modify TBP:
61 Cf. Schleiermacher 1830/31, § 47, 235.
62 It is important to note that “natural” in Schleiermacher’s sense does not mean 
naturalistic. The actions of free agents (such as human beings) are in accordance with the 
order of nature. In other words: Events are meant to be altered by beings that participate 
in nature and are parts of nature.
63 Cf. Schleiermacher 1830/31, § 47, 236, 237.
64 Cf. Schleiermacher 1830/31, § 47, 240. Cf. parallel arguments in Béla Weissmahr, 
Gottes Wirken in der Welt: Ein Diskussionsbeitrag zur Frage der Evolution und des Wunders, 
(Frankfurt a.M.: Knecht-Verlag, 1973); Gordon Kaufman, “On the Meaning of ‘Act 
of God’,” in God’s Activity in the World, ed. Owen C. Thomas (Chico: Scholar’s Press, 
1983), 137–161. 
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(TBP*) A transcendent and absolute being cannot intervene directly 
in the course of the world because whatever acts as an absolute 
cause cannot act as a relative cause (within the world).
For the idealistic approach presented by Schleiermacher, relative 
causes are finite causes that are somehow part of the spatio-temporal 
fabric of the universe. Since God is beyond space and time, TBP* is 
a consequence of an idealistic understanding of God’s ontological 
primacy and eternity.65
It is important to notice that contemporary discussions of divine 
eternity seem to revolve around the problems presented by TBP*. At 
least in a reverse sense, these discussions give TBP* some credit. This is 
the reason why some atemporalists66 developed the idea of an eternal act 
of God (which unfolds with the development of the universe) and why 
some temporalists67 are eager to dismiss a traditional notion of eternity 
in order to defeat TBP*. Even if one questioned the validity of TBP* 
some of Schleiermacher’s claims would still remain as thought-provoking 
questions: How could it be possible that God, as the absolute cause of 
being, acts within the framework of finite causes in order to replace 
finite causes every so often?68 Apart from the fact that the admission of 
such a possibility might have disastrous consequences for the problem 
of theodicy, it is hard to imagine that God could act as a finite cause 
without becoming finite (i.e. spatio-temporal) Himself. If one wants 
to avoid any kind of non-interventionism (idealistic or otherwise) the 
only response one could give to this problem would be a reflection on 
65 Cf. Schleiermacher 1830/31, § 52.
66 Cf. Paul Helm, “Divine Timeless Eternity,” in God and Time: Four Views, ed. 
Gregory E. Ganssle (Downers Grove: Inter Varistiy Press, 2001), 28–60; Helm, “Response 
to Critics,” in God and Time, 79–91.
67 Cf. Nicholas Wolterstorff, “Unqualified Divine Temporality,” in God and Time, 
187–213; Wolterstorff, “Response to Paul Helm,” in God and Time, 68–78.
68 Of course, a whole bunch of questions will arise from any adaptation of TBP* 
since some might feel that this is straightforward deism. But a more careful reading of 
TBP* could defuse this impression: TBP* holds that God cannot act as a finite cause in 
the course of events; it does not exclude the possibility that God indirectly influences 
the course of the world.
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our lack of imagination.69 In any case, to cope with the problems of 
apparent divine non-intervention in the light of evil an interventionist 
has to pay the price for strategy A) unless he/she wants to hide behind 
a cloud of mystery.
69 This would be Kreiner’s response to non-interventionism; cf. Kreiner 2006, 325, 332. 
Kreiner himself has a strong inclination to support open theism and to stick to a Natural-
Law-Defense which conflates natural-law-necessity with logical necessity. Cf. Kreiner 
1997, 300–313, 364–379. Usually the so-called lack of imagination in non-interventionsim 
is more than counter-balanced by a very vivid imagination in interventionist approaches, 
cf. Ward 2007, 119–133, 170–189. 
